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Abstract
Corporate governance sits at the intersection of many disciplines, among them law,
business, management, finance, and accounting. The point of departure for large portions
of this literature concerns the ugliness of greed, ambition, misdemeanors, and malfea-
sance of corporations, their directors, and those actors who hold shares in them. This
essay takes a rather different starting point. Drawing upon insights from a distant field, it
uses the discussion of aesthetics in Dewey’s treatise on art to ask what motivates directors
to act in ways that constitute the attention and engagement that we associate with the
effectiveness of boards. Using Dewey’s thinking about aesthetic experience, this paper
examines the experience of organization boards, both in the literature and in the personal
experience of the author. These observations point to need to reflect on motivation when
considering both the practice of corporate governance and the policy frameworks in
which it operates.
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Introduction
The oak-paneled walls of the stately boardroom of one company where I worked were covered
with large canvases painted by a variety of modern artists: impressionists, post-impressionists,
and expressionists. The plain, plasterboard walls of boardroom of a charity I serve are lined
with more modest yet no less evocative works: paintings, mainly on paper, by some of the
people we help with their learning difficulties, mental health issues, and dementia.
The first, to be sure, was an ostentatious display for the few allowed to enter this special
place. The second shows a need to brighten up the grim physical space, which doubles on
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gestures also suggest that organizations – or more specifically the evolving groups of people
who lead them – choose to remind themselves, and those who will follow them, of the larger
things in life, outside the immediate issues needing decisions, and that the directors themselves
like to be reminded of them.
Although the subject of, or analogies to, aesthetics rarely come up in writing on corporate
governance, occasionally we find references to art in scholarly writing about management and
leadership (Strati 1999; Ladkin 2008; Adler and Delbecq 2018). This essay uses the work of
John Dewey to stretch such discussion into the boardroom. It wonders, how might board
deliberations present something other than the problem of the self-centered, self-important
agent we hear so much of in the literature of corporate governance? How might the forms of
corporate governance conducted in these rooms be, well, beautiful?
Corporate governance can be ugly. At the top of corporations, greed seems prevalent and
stewardship lacking; hostilities erupt around contested takeovers, vulture capitalism, and activist
hedge funds instigating disruption. Other types of organizations, too, are replete with interpersonal
rivalry, pay excesses and self-serving managers, and a sense of a need to win at the expense of
other organizations that would eat our lunch. Such phenomena have generated considerable
academic study – drawn from accountancy, financial economics, sociology, and (the lack of)
business ethics. Much of it seeks to diagnose the causes from the symptoms of such corporate
malaise and inform regulation and codes of conduct in the hope of curing the problem.
After sketching the history of corporate governance and the problems and purposes of
boards, let us consider the argument of the pragmatist philosopher John Dewey that art can
best be understood when viewed not as an object, but instead as an experience – of both the
artist and the audience – and that experience invests meaning in activity. His theorizing took
place in the intellectual context of the disruptions in trade, society, and politics of the 1930s
and the Great Depression, ugly events that also spawned public concern for corporate
governance.
Then we look at how such theorizing lets us reflect on the work and motivation of directors,
drawing evidence from a combination of experience depicted in scholarly studies of boards,
reports based on board observation, and my own experience of acting as a director. This essay
highlights in the work of directors the possibility of a heightened sensibility akin to that of
aesthetic experience, which may account for a part of director motivation that the corporate
governance literature has largely overlooked. It concludes with observations about how those
insights about what does right in boardrooms can help us better understand where they go
wrong, and what directors, policymakers and the public at large can expect to achieve.
Governing: The Purpose and Problems of Boards
The study of corporate governance largely arose from concern about problems with corpora-
tions and the people who direct them. Boards are seen as mechanisms of governance, to
control the agency problem arising when managers work for distant owners (Fama and Jensen
1983; Jensen and Meckling 1976), or to mediate transaction costs hierarchically, rather than
through markets (Williamson 1996; Blair and Stout 1999). Such considerations assume
directors are governance instruments; they dominate empirical study, despite often ambiguous
empirical findings (Bosse and Phillips 2016) and theoretical misgivings (Roberts et al. 2005).
The problems of corporate governance trace their roots to theWall Street Crash of 1929 and
the Great Depression that followed. Berle and Means (1932/1991) argued that widespread
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corporate failure in the years leading up to the crash arose from the increasing separation of
corporate owners from the control of the corporation. It provided the base of agency theory.
Coase (1937) then suggested that the purpose of companies was to internalize transactions
that markets could not efficiently conduct, creating the basis of transaction cost economics. A
different view of corporate purpose arose in that time as well: that private enterprises, rather
than the state, bring value to society through innovation and entrepreneurship. It is rooted in
the thinking of Schumpeter, who located social good and not just social irresponsibility in
corporate enterprise (published later as Schumpeter 1942/1976). Here, the creators are the
entrepreneurs, who are not necessarily the owners.
These seminal works outlined the problems in capitalism and sought solutions that could
defend it against a socialist or communist alternative. Grounded in these ways, the so-called
theory of the firm explained how – despite the Crash – corporate entities bring about economic
growth and ultimately societal value. And far from being dismantled as a hazard to society,
corporations flourished, became more central, more important in western economies, and more
dominant in the lives of people. Success also bred excess, in executive pay, diversions of
corporate resources for personal gain, and recurrent cases of corporate collapse (MacAvoy and
Millstein 2003; Nordberg 2020).
Scholars have sought to identify ways to prevent corporate malfeasance, identifying board-
focused inputs, like board composition or director independence, that might deter corporate
excess and improve corporate outcomes (e.g. Payne et al. 2009). Such analyses yielded
ambiguous results (Dalton and Aguinis 2013; Daily et al. 2003), yet practitioners – directors
and the consultants who serve them – often find in them something helpful. Policymakers have
sought to use them to design structures and mechanisms in the pursuit of best practice, which
inform legal and regulatory moves to constrain corporate managements and boards, or codes of
conduct to guide boards toward safer outcomes. This is often called the “control” role of
boards.
The corporate governance literature identifies a second role for boards, however, one of
“service” (Hillman and Dalziel 2003). This view sees directors facilitating access to resources,
with outside, non-executive directors helping managers through boundary-spanning activities
and contributions to strategic decisions.
While valuable in identifying and potentially solving the problems of governing organiza-
tions, such economics-focused analysis overlooks an element that the practitioners I know see
as important: the pleasure in, and the sensation of, creating value. It is a sense that directors and
senior managers often seem to derive from the processes of board decision-making. The work
directors seem most proud of is fending off disasters, thwarting attacks, and preventing the
departures of key personnel. Quiet accounts of directors are brightened by expressions of a job
well done, even if the job done leaves no trace visible to the outside world, which may not
even be recorded in the confidential minutes of board meetings. Such achievements rarely hit
the headlines or form the basis of an entry or black mark on a director’s curriculum vitae. They
defy observation, let alone measurement of the efficiency in process or the success in terms of
outcomes.
The director’s role we call “outside” in America or “non-executive” in Britain comes with
symbolic and pecuniary rewards, that is, the status of being “director” or an income for
seemingly little work but also at some risk. At large companies, directors give their advice
for levels of pay comparable to top management consultants. In smaller firms, the rewards are
less generous; in charities, directors make similar time commitments, but most go without pay.
And, unlike shareholders, who can lose only as much (or little) as they invest, the directors
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those investors elect to serve them face unlimited, personal liability when decisions go wrong,
protected in part by insurance. Consultants can often retreat unnoticed from failed projects.
Directors risk being prohibited from serving again on boards.
Against such a background, why would someone want to be a company director? This
paper asks a narrower version of that question: If motivation includes the sense of satisfaction
that directors derive from their work, how does it arise? It seeks an answer by drawing upon
theory developed at great distance from the disciplines that usually inform writings on boards
of directors.
Art, Experience, and the Great Depression
In his 1930s lectures at Harvard University in memory of William James, the American
philosopher and polymath John Dewey laid out a theory of aesthetics, subsequently published
as Art as Experience (1934/1958). The date of delivery and publication is pertinent. This was a
few years after the Wall Street Crash, the first global corporate governance crisis, when
thinkers from a wide range of fields were trying to understand what had gone wrong.
On the surface, the subject of Dewey’s essay could scarcely be more remote from the
corporation and its economics. He writes on painting, sculpture, architecture, the novel, and
poetry, and how both the artist and the audience draw meaning from the experience of the
artistic creation. His depiction of the aesthetic has little to do with narrow conceptions of “high
art.” Dewey was an early advocate of the aesthetics of jazz, which many high-brow critics of
the time dismissed as noise. He writes that to understand the aesthetic, “one must begin with it
in the raw … the sights that hold the crowd – the fire engine rushing by; the machines
excavating enormous holes in the earth” (Dewey 1934/1958). These are examples of the
sensation of the observer. A little later he writes, “The intelligent mechanic engaged in his job,
interested in doing well and finding satisfaction in his handiwork, caring for his materials and
tools with genuine affection, is artistically engaged”; this depicts the creator’s response. In
contemporary as well as ancient societies, practices including body scarification, ornamental
dress and jewelry indicate that “everything that intensifies the sense of immediate living in an
object of intense admiration” (1934/1958).
He rejects theories of art that spiritualize it “out of connection with the objects of concrete
experience.” Art is “the living and concrete proof that man is capable of restoring consciously,
and thus on the plane of meaning, the union of sense, need, impulse and action.” With these
observations, Dewey brings us a range of objectives that art serves but not quite a definition of
art as experience. We have “an experience when the material experienced runs its course to
fulfillment” (1934/1958, emphasis in the orginal).
This assertion is a definition even his supporters say is incomplete and perhaps paradoxical.
In a book largely honoring Dewey, Shusterman (2000) calls his “clearly an inadequate and
inaccurate definition”. In Dewey’s defense, Shusterman asserts that this approach was, at least,
not part of the “long history of failed attempts at essentialist definitions of art” (2000). Dewey
did not attempt to articulate the essence of art, which would have defied the nonfoundationalist
core of his pragmatist philosophy. Instead, he calls attention to the pragmatists’ view of the
centrality of practice. For Dewey, artistic sensation arises not in the object, the thing created,
but rather in the experience of creating and then observing it. The heightened sensitivity, the
intensification of the immediate, achieved in the experience of making or apprehending the
aesthetic object is what signifies the artistic.
Philosophy of Management
On this view, art-as-experience implies something historically situated, enduring but
impermanent, reflective of and dependent on context, with meaning created from the interac-
tion of the creator and then audience with the thing created. This is not an aesthetics of ideal
types, of striving for perfection. The experience of the artist will differ from that of the
audience. Yet both will deem their experience as art when they encounter enhanced sensitivity
and sensibility, that is, when the experience brings new sensations, cognitive and emotional.
Moreover, apprehension – by creator and observer – of routine, imitative, mass-produced
objects may not achieve such feelings, producing instead something that might be termed, as
Smuts (2005) argues, an “anesthetic experience.”
For Dewey, aesthetic experience has a moral dimension, a proposition he argues through the
negative. “One great defect in what passes for morality is its anesthetic quality. Instead of
exemplifying wholehearted action, it takes the form of grudging piecemeal concessions to the
demands of duty” (1934/1958). When the artist or the audience focuses on duty to some external
standard their sensitivity can be blunted. Turning the argument around, he argues that, for the
Greeks, moral action involves conduct that is elegant, in proportion, and graceful. Practical activity,
he writes, has an aesthetic quality when it is “integrated and moves by its own urge to fulfillment.”
Dewey links this fulfillment to the artist’s “unusual sensitivity to the qualities of things”
(1934/1958), as artists shape and reshape their objects until they are satisfied with what they
perceive in them. The audiences of art – the beholders, in Dewey’s argument – perceive the
object by creating their own experiences of it, perceptions comparable to but necessarily not
identical with those of the artist.
This experiential view of art, related to but separate from the object, can apply to performance
arts: to drama, which is enacted and then is no more; to improvisational jazz, which lacks even a
script; and to art installations, in which the thing experienced is in part the experiences of other
members of the audience. Let us draw an analogy, then, and consider how we can think of non-
things – management and leadership, for example – as beautiful or ugly, as well as mundane or
dull. And if art lies not so much in the tangible object but in the experience, the term might
justifiably be used to signify the experience of the intangible as well.
The Art of and in Corporate Governance
Because the corporate governance literature focuses on organizational issues, accounts of
director experiences are rare. Concerns that dominate include the search for solutions to the
“agency problem” of self-serving managers, in which boards are mechanisms and directors
instruments (Kumar and Zattoni 2018). The quest for stewardship by company directors and
top managers takes us theoretically into the realm of psychology (Davis et al. 1997), though
with the intent of identifying paths to better firm performance. Studies that penetrate the fabled
“black box” of the boardroom (Zona and Zattoni 2007) tend to examine processes and
practices like strategy work (Concannon and Nordberg 2018; Machold et al. 2011; McNulty
and Pettigrew 1999), rather than director motivations.
There are occasional glimpses of attitudes and feelings, however. Reflecting on her investigations
of board work, involving repeated interviews over a decade with individual directors, Pye (2002)
reaches into the language of art to assert that “it is impossible to define an ideal culture, particularly
where the tone and tenor of relationships amongst board members influences conduct.” Samra-
Fredericks (2000) dissects the validity claims of directors and top managers in discussion and how
telling a strategy “story” in a way that “others have to believe it” provides a “feel good factor.”
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The autoethnographic work of Parker (2007a, 2007b) documents the inner workings of the
boards of professional organizations. He describes how individual directors champion causes,
formally and informally, to command attention of the others and how behavior differs
depending on the assertiveness of the CEO. Mutual respect provides a “social lubricant” and
permitting contentious issues to be discussed with “informality and humour” (Parker 2007b).
In another autoethnographic account, Gibbon (2012) reaches for metaphor – of a garden and a
jigsaw puzzle – to record her sense of satisfaction concerning the “uncertain, complex andmessy”
nature of accountability in the setting of a board of a nonprofit organization. She reflects that the
garden metaphor may mislead by suppressing certain features of the experience, the way “weeds,
pests and unexpected weather conditions to reveal a different perspective.”As close as these come
to showing us the inner workings of boards, they remain descriptive of behavior or reflective of
reaction to processes. They do not quite capture how the directors found expression in the
boardroom or how they felt about the expression of others.
How, then, might we employ Dewey’s concept of art-as-experience to understand the work
of corporate directors? Dewey’s treatise does not offer a handy template to assess its applica-
tion to other fields; indeed, imagining that it might could be antithetical to his argument.
Instead, let us consider here, tentatively, the elements of the work of boards of directors, how
they might constitute the “act of expression” (Chapter IV), the iterative construction and
reconstruction involved in creating a “union of sense, need, impulse and action” and of
practitioners “finding satisfaction” in their “handiwork” (1934/1958), expressions Dewey uses
to describe the experience of creation. Then let us consider, even more tentatively, how
observers of board meetings – the middle-ranking executives invited to present to the board,
or new directors finding their way into discussions of longstanding, gnarled problems – finding
meaning through the experience.
To do so, I draw in part upon some of the less fully articulated aspects of qualitative studies
of boards in operation. To overcome the thinness of the data, I draw as well on personal
reflections of the boards on which I have served, an unconventional approach but one with
parallels in the reflection that underpins practitioner accounts that occasionally appear in
academic journals on management, as well as much philosophical writing. Of the boards I
served, two were small, private firms in publishing, which sought capital for expansion and
then proved unable to use it to good effect. Two others were large charities, with income in the
millions and tens of millions of pounds sterling, each with active and engaged boards.
Board meetings of one of the publishing companies were infrequent, acrimonious, and
unproductive. The company limped on for several years before collapsing. The other had
frequent and full meetings, leading to collective decisions the participants found satisfying. But
the company’s financial circumstances were far more fragile than we thought, which led to its
ultimate failure. The charities both dealt with difficult finances – not-for-profit organizations
rarely achieve the financial buffer to guarantee viability – but board meetings were productive,
insightful, and enlightening, for managers and directors alike. In early 2020, both charities
faced potential existential threats in the coronavirus and covid-19 pandemic.
The Act of Expression
For Dewey, expression involves more than an explosion of emotion. For example, he draws a
contrast between self-expression and self-exposure; the latter involves disclosing character to
others in a way that is “only a spewing forth” (1934/1958). Dewey (1934/1958) describes the
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act of expression as arising from an “impulsion.” He draws a distinction to an impulse, which
is “specialized and particular.” Impulsion is a movement outward and forward of the whole
organism, like a craving for food. Impulsion alone is not sufficient for expression, however.
When impulsion meets resistance, the person is forced into reflection, a “transformation of
energy into thoughtful action”; “emotional discharge is a necessary but not a sufficient
condition for expression” (Dewey 1934/1958).
In a study for a professional body, Kakabadse et al. (2017) report on a company chairman,
who remarked: “I used to talk about boards as being like an orchestra. You want different
instruments who together make, not a discordant noise, but a harmonious noise. Not too
harmonious.” Here, we can see in action the distinction Dewey makes between self-expression
and self-exposure. Being “not too harmonious” is set against not just harmony, but also
“discordant noise”; it signifies the boardroom equivalent of musical complexity. Discordant
noise on its own is, in Dewey’s term, self-exposure: emotional discharge in disregard of others.
The lack of expression is captured by Langevoort (2001), who writes of boards where the
outside, non-executive directors have been captured by the CEO. They become mere social
clubs with a rubber stamp to approve the CEO’s decisions. Sonnenfeld et al. (2013) found that
many chief executives expressed disappointment in outside directors who failed to provide the
resistance that leads to reflection. Such experience might be described as artless, anesthetic
corporate governance (Cf. Cohen 2007).
My experience of boards has examples of the anesthetic. At board meetings, when the
executives were well prepared even if the non-executives were rather less so, decisions passed
easily and efficiently; executives were content with the outcomes; yet no one felt proud of their
work. By contrast, board meetings in which challenge took place, during which both execu-
tives and non-executives learned more about the business and its problems, led to a sense of
satisfaction, even delight, at the experience. Strangely, that sensation arose even in circum-
stances where the decisions were not universally welcomed and did not resolve the problems
those boards were trying to address. What mattered was that the encounters increased
awareness of the complexities.
For example, in a social-care business, where the sources of income – local government
agencies who are the “customers” – hold all the power, boards have few levers to improve
performance. But we came to realize that through what Dewey might call each director’s
“impulsion” to make things better, which met resistance: Some directors backed alternative
approaches with considerable vigor but then backed away as greater insight into the power
relationships became clear and a partial consensus emerged. Such debate creates the height-
ened sensitivity to complex of context and resources, of opportunities and limitations. This
discord within harmony is akin to artistic expression.
Within expression, Dewey (1934/1958) notes four characteristics of art: a) its creation of an
integral experience, in which b) the object comes about through pressure on natural impulses,
implying c) that construction requires time, not instantaneous emission, and d) excitement in
production stirs up the store of attitudes and meanings. Let us look at each in turn.
Integral Experience
For Dewey, an integral experience arises from the “interaction of organic and environmental
conditions and energies” (1934/1958). He leaves this depiction rather vague, but the argument
points to the substance of the artist (“organic”) interacting with the surrounding materials and
circumstances. It seems to indicate the importance of what one of Dewey’s most influential
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followers terms “contingency” (Rorty 1989). In the setting of boards, the experience of integration
comes as we build a picture of the business as a whole and how it aligns with the contingencies of
the business environment, reacting or failing to reaction to changing circumstances.
Some studies have sought to capture the ethos of the boardroom and its interaction through
the comments that directors make to consultations about the codification of board practice.
Spira and Slinn (2013) give an account of the formulation of the Cadbury Code in the UK,
which cites in part comments from corporate directors about the negative impact the code
might have on the candor of board discussion, pitting non-executives directors against the
executives. They feared the experience of board work would disintegrate. Nordberg (2017)
extends that by examining how directors sought to preserve a version of board ethos through
the drafting of three major versions of the UK code over two decades, and their fear of a loss of
intensity of interaction. In both accounts, we hear corporate directors arguing that the
constraints proposed will stifle open discussion and drive a wedge between directors engaged
in complex relationships. Advocates of constraints suggest that is the point of codes: to prevent
cozy relationships from forming that might lead to less stringent monitoring of managerial
behavior. These are, respectively, arguments for and against the integral/organic stance,
against and for rules to replace contingency.
In my cases, both publishing businesses involved creative individuals with a store of
knowledge and the ability to project it into words and images in print. Both faced the challenge
of the sudden explosion of the internet, however, which was replacing print publications and
opening new avenues that had little to do with the skills resident “organically” in the
companies. Acrimonious board meetings took place at one of them, when management refused
even to discuss how the business idea might be translated into a different medium. At the
other, the while the problem was recognized, the skills deficit of the incumbents, and the
incumbents’ voting power, we failed to resolve the issues. Such meetings were unsatisfying in
their outcomes, but they nonetheless yielded greater appreciation of the issues among all the
directors and a degree of satisfaction among directors. Whatever the quality of the experience,
the lack of tangible progress at both firms had consequences. As opportunities were debated
but left for others to pursue, finances grew tight and pressure mounted.
Pressure and Time
For Dewey, the experience of pressure and time are deeply linked:
The thing expressed is wrung from the producer by the pressure exercised by objective
things upon natural impulses and tendencies – so far is expression from being the direct
and immaculate issue of the latter.… The act of construction in time that constitutes a
work of art is a construction in time, not an instantaneous emission (Dewey 1934/1958).
Expression is thus mediated. Artists use tools to shape the raw materials and mental effort to
shape the ideas and emotions. They follow impulses but also employ pre-existing templates.
Art has its genres as well as tools that infer imitation and bring the legitimacy of recognition.
The artist then constructs the object and reconstructs it through revision and iteration. These
are the changes a painter makes while making sense of the thing observed and the ideas that
come to mind, or the revisions a writer makes in crafting a manuscript and finding the right
words. Dewey holds that “expression of the self in and through a medium … is itself a
prolonged interaction.” Both the self and the medium “acquire a form and order they did not at
first possess” (1934/1958, emphasis in the original).
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In board work, iteration to achieve meaning takes a different form. There are internal
pressures, the cognitive conflict that comes with the non-routine work of board, but also
external pressures of contracts and regulative constraints, templates based in law or the practice
of codes of conduct. Pressure is intensified by time constraints, deadlines and decisions to be
made irrespective of the completeness of information available. But time plays a formative role
as well. Directors come to know each other’s capabilities and the possibilities and limitations
of the resource base.
The value arising from prolonged interaction is a reason that directors cite for resisting calls in
codes for shorter director terms of office and for favoring staggered terms of office. The opposing
argument, made from the shareholder side, is that longer, overlapping terms make both change
and monitoring more difficult (Conference Board 2019; Govindarajan and Srivastava 2018). This
suggests that, for directors, art-like elevation of sensibilities is unlikely to come from routine
monitoring and control tasks but instead during tasks related to problem-solving and strategy
formation associated with the service role of boards (Hillman and Dalziel 2003).
Most research into the strategy work of boards seeks either to link boards to outcomes
(reviewed in Judge and Talaulicar 2017) or, in qualitative studies to understand the processes
they use (Pettigrew and McNulty 1998; McNulty and Pettigrew 1999). Nonetheless, these
studies and others provide glimpses of sources of director satisfaction that can arise. Consider,
for example, the experience of consultant-like liminality in board work, in which directors
actively sought informal ways to strategize when the pressure of routine compliance
constrained the official board agenda in ways that blocked strategic discussion (Concannon
and Nordberg 2018).
Working with the constraints, shaping the organization and its decisions to them, confers
legitimacy (Cornforth and Edwards 1999), but following Dewey’s thinking, mere mimesis
would represent a less elevating experience. Directors of the two professional organization
boards studied by Parker (2007a) dealt with compliance and engaged in formal strategic
planning. But they favored informal strategizing, often punctuated by “flashes of individual
insights.” The more formal aspects of strategizing matched expectations of major stakeholders,
enhancing legitimacy, while the informal aspect generated greater satisfaction.
Facing a strategic issue that imperiled one of the charities I serve, board meetings were still
plagued by routine. We dispensed with that quickly, however, and made space in the agenda
for free and frank discussions of the failures of prior approaches, the lessons to be drawn from
them, and the generation of options for a way forward from the current predicament. That the
discussions were frank led to pressure for action. That the actions did not yield the desired
outcome by the deadlines led to further pressure but also deeper understanding of the internal
weakness that needed to be addressed.
When the covid pandemic struck in 2020, both boards dispensed with much routine,
empowering emergency committees to decide on responses to financial emergencies (at one,
this proved not to be needed). Those taking part in these meetings, quickly became alert to
details of the business and its operations in ways they had not followed, or needed to, in the
more leisurely pace of ordinary business. We were unable to do very much at all; the power lay
elsewhere, and luck played a big role. But we were connected. Those left off these committees,
however, felt cut off, deprived of the experience.
In such board work, challenge to material presented by the executive is reflected against the
outside experiences of non-executive directors and followed by the distillation of views into
decisions. In the constantly shifting business environments of high-technology industries or
social enterprises dependent upon powerful state buyers, decisions made once may need
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continual refinement and modification. Even when time was of the essence, decisions still take
time and iteration. This points to a continuing need to return to the store of prior experiences
and then back to the strategy canvas.
Exciting the ‘Store’
For Dewey, the interaction of the internal and external, the compression involved in their
integration, and the duration of the effort combine on a subject whose matter goes deep. When
that happens, it can stir up “a store of attitudes and meanings derived from prior experience.”
He likens this process to fire, which then inspires but also creates commotion and turmoil. It
makes conscious thoughts, emotions, and images. That “fire” will either burn out or “press
itself out … into a refined product…. Unless there is com-pression nothing is ex-pressed”
(Dewey 1934/1958, punctuation in the original).
Much of the debate in the board meetings is routine, even perfunctory; it is the least likely
to excite (ICSA 2011; Stiles and Taylor 2001; Parker 2007a). Decisions needs approval for
reasons of constitutional formalities or because the value of a contract exceeds the agreed limit
of managerial discretion. But those are not the decisions that directors remember, find
satisfaction in having achieved, or regret for years to come. Board discussion of a proposed
acquisition, a line of credit, or a regulatory action with implications for revenue, and how each
would impact the risk calculus and reserves, involves debates that stir up meanings for other
aspects of the business as well as memories of past decisions that have gone well or badly.
These views are then synthesized, with parts rejected as less or irrelevant, in a word,
compressed, pointing us toward the final expression. A multiple case study by Garg and
Eisenhardt (2017) of boards of venture capital-backed businesses shows the importance of the
dyadic relationship of the CEO and individual directors, but its selection of quotations also
shows the excitement (or disappointment) about being included (or excluded) from discussions
that matter.
In early 2020, as the covid-19 pandemic deepened and widened, the board of one of the
organizations I serve held its final face-to-face meeting before the lockdown. We discussed the
looming crisis, the steps that were needed and the ones that were closed to us, the financial and
reputational risks, the way operations might adjust, the effects on beneficiaries, and potential
ways to reconfigure service delivery. The board decided nothing; indeed, we felt helpless
ahead of the storm. But the discussion led many of the directors to dig into their store of their
experience for analogies, hints of what options might arise and how we might enact them. We
each seemed to know that most and perhaps all of this would be useless, except perhaps in
helping senior management anticipate the unexpected. When we had finished, one director
smiled broadly as he left the room. “Good meeting!” he shouted in farewell to us all.
The Experience of Observers
Dewey’s account of the nature of observer/audience experience of art is less fully articulated,
but he draws a clear distinction between being receptive and passive. Receptivity is a process
involving a “series of responsive acts that accumulate toward objective fulfillment” without
which “there is not perception but [merely] recognition.” Experiencing a work of art is thus an
active engagement with it, seeing the uniqueness of it, not the stereotypical. “The perceived
object or scene is emotionally pervaded throughout,” he writes (1934/1958). That is, the
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emotions of the observer give meaning as much as those of the artist. “For to perceive, a
beholder must create his own experience” (1934/1958, emphasis in the original). In this
experience, the observer is the creator.
Corporate directors perform for a variety of audiences: investment analysts, shareholders,
employees, even less well-defined ones during appearances on television. But these settings have
little in common with the boardroom, where meetings take place with a high degree of
confidentiality. Within the board, individual directors perform for each other, of course, though
that “audience” is also an “actor.” Their experience is as much as that of a creator as it is of an
observer. In the practice of corporate boards, the role of the audience in art is analogous to the
presence of observers in board meetings. Academic literature on boards provides scant evidence
of such events. Far more often, the board is called a “black box” from which observers are
excluded (Klarner et al. 2020; Rost and Osterloh 2010). Researchers only occasionally penetrate
it, and then to study directors (e.g. Pugliese et al. 2015), and not themselves.
There are, however, a few exceptions. A UK professional body examined what happens in
meetings in large healthcare organizations when members of the public attend. Agendas and
board discussions both avoided controversy and strategic debate, focusing instead on the
routine (ICSA 2011). Knowing that they were being observed, these boards may have changed
their behavior, however, and ethnographic accounts of boards are rare. Here I will draw on the
anecdotal.
Visitors to the boards on which I have served talk about being there as a privilege, an
intense experience of the complexity of decision-making and the scope of issues with which
directors wrestled. These individuals were mainly middle managers unaccustomed to regular
interactions with non-executive directors or executives acting in their role as directors. A few
were “trainee directors,” individuals thought to have the potential to serve on the board and
granted full access to board meetings and papers for a time, but without voting rights or legal
responsibilities. Those enterprises are relatively simple businesses, with far fewer moving parts
than a major listed company. Nonetheless visitors felt heightened awareness of business issues
and gained insights they could not have experienced from outside. Visitors express what
Dewey’s formulation would call perception, not just recognition.
Discussion
Dewey’s ideas in aesthetics have not gone unnoticed in corporate governance. Pye (2001)
notes that it helped her frame an eclectic study of boards. Still, there are at least two reasons to
be cautious in stretching Dewey conceptualization into a seemingly unrelated field, especially
with such limited evidence. First, Dewey’s is a formulation of its time and, in keeping with the
pragmatist philosophy he espoused, it must be historically situated. Dewey might exclude
much “high art” for its lack of emotion, but he relished jazz. Would he in old age have been
happy with Los Angeles-style 1950s free jazz, or now with hip-hop? Second, even an
intellectual friend like Shusterman finds Dewey’s aesthetics incomplete. Dewey’s distinction
between expression and exposure, which relegates spontaneous explosions of emotion to a
lesser state leads him (as observer) to disqualify Van Gogh’s creations as art. What would he
have made Jackson Pollock? That is, even applied to its own field Dewey’s theory begs
questions.
However, this paper does not assert theoretical completeness or claim discovery of a perfect
analytic fit to the landscape of corporate governance. Nor does it assert that aesthetic
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experiences are frequent in boardrooms; indeed, the scant evidence in scholarly writing or
practitioner accounts suggests it is not. Nor do such accounts allow us to think that an aesthetic
view of governance could improve outcomes in terms of better firm performance or reduced
risk. Instead, it seeks more modestly to suggest that our view of corporate governance may be
enhanced by considering what excites directors in their work, and in so doing excite interest in
exploring the experience of directors and corporate boards with fresh lenses.
Research that justifies governance activities by their outcomes takes an organizational and
sometimes societal vantage point as to what matters. In so doing, it turns boards and directors
into instruments of corporate performance and gives impetus to attempts to standardize
structures and processes. When policy follows such guidance, it risks ignoring the humanist
side of corporate governance, the motivation that leads people to engage in the effort. One
aspect of that – and only one – may be the aesthetic aspects of board work.
Implications for Practice of Corporate Governance
This paper asked the question, why would someone want to be a corporate director? Yes, the role
comes with some glamor and external esteem, and often with some money. Even unpaid director-
ships can be stepping-stones to something more lucrative. But if the argument in this paper is valid,
then those directors may wish to reflect on what holds their fellow directors’ attention. Many of the
failings in corporate governance recorded in practitioner writing and in press accounts point the
finger at directors or regulators who were absent or “asleep at the wheel” (Gribben 2008; see also
MacAvoy and Millstein 2003). While some cases of a lack of watchfulness may be deliberate –
directors choosing to ignore malfeasance or misdemeanors – the study of UK National Health
Service boards illustrates how directors overlook important issues by the sheer tedium of the agenda
(ICSA 2011). Keeping them alert requires an approach that commands their attention, which may
be aided by seeing board work as a vehicle for expression. To be sure, much of board practice will
remain routine, focused on the operational and compliance and lacking in emotional content. That is
what in art Dewey calls “anesthetic.” But as the report on NHS governance by ICSA (2011) might
have concluded, anesthetic governance can put you to sleep.
In the accounts above – from those few studies that penetrate the “black box” and from my
reflections on events – we hear directors valorizing the intrinsic motivation that can come from
the sense of an integrated whole that the work affords. There is also evidence of how the board
provides a collective experience, building a social identity among the participants. Although it
would be difficult to conduct such research, it would be helpful, for board practice and policy,
to discover the conditions under which directors shake off the routine in favor of the aesthetic
experience, but also the ways in which regular engagement with the routine prepares them for
the extraordinary. As Dewey says, the artist experiences creation over time; self-expression is
more than self-exposure. Heightened sensitivity may also arise among seemingly non-
participating directors, those who listen quietly and say little. They may be observing now,
while also building up a store that can be excited later, for example, in a boardroom coup that
topples an incumbent but underperforming CEO.
Implications for Corporate Governance Policy
Policy, too, can present a danger to the aesthetics of corporate governance. Focusing on
outcomes-based analysis risks creating practices that reduce the work of directors to box-
ticking (Fenwick and Vermeulen 2018; Rushton 2008), to mere compliance without reference
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to meaning-making (Filatotchev and Nakajima 2014). This is what Dewey might call a
practice that fails to excite the “store” of meanings from experience. The work might lack
the sense of integration that Parker (2007a) reports and that Dewey would see as an “expe-
rience” worthy of the name.
This argument does not diminish the importance of analysis in corporate governance, or of
the need for psychic distance and challenge in the boardroom often associated with board
effectiveness (Forbes and Milliken 1999; Nordberg and Booth 2019). Those aspects are often
precisely what turns the practice of boards into an aesthetic experience for directors by
showing the picture of the company in the round. Codes of conduct and regulation of practices
like audit and corporate reporting can provide frameworks that directors see as elegant
approaches to messy problems, as ways of seeing the whole among the pieces. But making
compliance a mechanical exercise runs the risk of preventing directors perceiving the connec-
tions. Doing so risks depriving them of the sense of the integrated whole involved in the sort of
decision-making from which they can derive satisfaction while also seeing issues in the round.
For Dewey (1934/1958), “The mechanical stands at the pole opposite to that of the esthetic.”
Limitations and Extensions
This analysis, viewing the experience of directors philosophically, as aesthetic satisfaction
alongside its consequentialist instrumentality, is both empirically and conceptually narrow.
The conceptual narrowness, a lens from a different domain in a rather different time, invites us
to consider what other lenses might show. Even with this lens the narrowness might be
overcome by examining another question: Does the “ugly” work of directors, the battles, the
unresolved issues, the bust-ups over policy decisions that lead individual directors to the exit,
also have an aesthetic quality? In the practice of the boards I have served, such events have
also brought about heightened sensibilities, visions of the whole that seem to be slipping from
our grasp. Not all dramas are comedies, after all; and the corporate world has experienced a fair
few tragedies. Empirically, further research into director experiences of boardroom practice
might include attempts to look beyond outcomes and processes into the psychological and
symbolic elements of board work. This paper has scratched those surfaces by asking about
director motivation and the meaning that physical boardrooms might bring to the experience of
what takes within them. Under what conditions does “anesthetic” corporate governance arise?
There are reasons to believe these observations may not translate fully into the realm of
large, listed companies, where other aspects of motivation apply. Non-executive directors in
such companies also have material interests, at least in the form of director fees, and the ability
to leverage board experience in one company to posts with others. Moreover, corporations can
also arrange insurance to mitigate directors’ personal financial liability if not their reputational
risk.1 Such firms have the resources to supply their boards with deeply researched proposals
and finely crafted solutions presented to the board for ratification, potentially making board
work more like dissection than creation. That is, the artistic experience may lie elsewhere in
the organization, rather than with the board. Might these factors be reasons for big company
boardroom ugliness?
1 The recent experience of the covid-19 pandemic illustrates the sense of personal risk that directors can face,
notwithstanding mitigation through insurance. Anecdotal evidence suggests that several providers of directors’
and officers’ insurance withdrew from writing new policies in frontline sectors like social care or agreeing to
increase coverage on existing policies. Brokers warned of large increases in premiums.
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Conclusions
The artwork we observed at the opening of this paper is emblematic of something for each
organization and the people who direct them. For one group, it was a sign of the success of the
business, a decision of directors who saw themselves at the forefront of its industry, steeped in
tradition (oak-paneled walls) but at the same to innovative and disruptive (impressionist,
expressionist). For the other it was statement – by the board and senior management together
– that the organization works for its beneficiaries. The objects themselves evidence directly
benefits and the process of delivering them. These are reminders to anyone who enters the
boardrooms of sort of experience they too should seek to achieve.
For Dewey, the “real work of art” is not the object created, but rather the psychic work it
does for the artist and audience, “the building up of an integral experience out of the interaction
of organic and environmental conditions and energies.” When the “excitement is deep” it stirs
up meanings from prior experiences, which inform activities that become “conscious thoughts
and emotions… To be set on fire by a thought or scene is to be inspired” (Dewey 1934/1958).
In this Deweyan view, we may wish to consider the value of corporate governance to be more
than just the outputs, not the statements in the annual report, and not even the profitability of a
business decision. Value may lie as well in the experience of undertaking challenge and
subsequent enlightenment, of constructing and reconstructing, over time, the basis of business
decisions.
Using the language of his day, when the masculine included the feminine, Dewey tells a
story of management:
Two men meet: one is the applicant for a position, while the other has the disposition of
the matter is his hands. The interview may be mechanical, consisting of set questions,
the replies to which perfunctorily settle the matter.… The situation is disposed of as if it
were an exercise in bookkeeping. But an interplay may take place in which a new
experience develops. Where should we look for an account of such an experience? Not
in ledger-entries nor yet to a treatise on economics or sociology or personnel psychol-
ogy, but to drama and fiction. Its nature can only be expressed in art, because there is a
unity of experience that can be expressed only as an experience (Dewey 1934/1958).
In the study of corporate governance, we pay attention to ledger entries, economics, sociology,
and psychology. We see – in academic studies and almost daily financial news media –
evidence of the ugliness in its execution. In its practice, however, we sometimes experience its
art. Perhaps we should study that, too.
In this small and tentative set of opinions and comments, the satisfaction participants in
board meetings feel seems to arise through senses sharpened by boardroom debate, the
experience of connecting many of the pieces of corporate decisions into a vision of the
corporate whole. A board agenda that looks at the pieces but does not provide the opportunity
to see the whole seems to present a different experience of being a director. If this argument is
valid, policy too might benefit from seeking connections so those engaged in board practice
might have a better chance of finding the art in corporate governance.
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